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I n  all of his work Saul Bellow has been concerned with the nature 
of individual identity in the mass-culture of the modern absurd 
world. His analyses of the quest of modern man for a meaningful 
existence in a postwar world which has lost all traditional values are 
based mainly upon the influences of two widely different - indeed 
even contradictory - philosophical schools. Keith Opdahl has 
pointed out that Bellow writes partly within the American Roman- 
tic literary tradition, and partly he adopts, and Americanizes, the 
theses of French existentia1ism.l This duplicity of philosophical ad- 
herence is employed throughout his fiction2 and Bellow seems to 
have adopted it in an attempt to compromise between the two con- 
tradictory world views which have been predominant in the Western 
world since Nietzsche proclaimed the death of God. I n  this article 
I shall be concerned only with the influence of French existential- 
ism on Bellow's work. 
Jean-Paul Sartre is the principal exponent of French existentialist 
philosophy, and it is mainly his work that has given Bellow inspira- 
tion for his novels. In his deliberate rupture with the metaphysical 
world view of the Middle Ages, Sartre maintains that existence pre- 
cedes essence3: Human beings exist, but what they are or what they 
may become depends entirely upon what they themselves choose to 
do. They must take the responsibility for their own development. 
Sartre makes a fundamental distinction between: 
1) the unconscious being, the being-in-itself ("en-soi"). This group 
consists of ordinary things and material objects. They are essen- 
tially what they are; i.e. they are what they are completely. They 
are solid  ma massif") . 
2) the conscious being, the being-for-itself (ccpour-soi"), on the other 
hand, is the human being with no fixed essence. The individual 
human being possesses the freedom to choose his own life. This 
freedom, however, soon turns out to be unbearable, and in the face 
of it the individual suffers anguish. He suffers because he knows. 
that everything is up to him, and he knows that he must take re- 
sponsibility for himself. But there are ways of trying to escape 
this anguish, for by attempting to conceal his freedom to himself, 
the individual may delude himself into thinking that he cannot 
help it if his life is miserable. I n  this case the individual shirks re- 
sponsibility for himself and instead he clings to some transcendent 
belief in "Destiny." This is what Sartre calls "mauvaise foi'" 
("bad faith"). "Bad faith" ccconsists in pretending that we are 
not free, that we are somehow determined, that we cannot help 
doing what we do, or having the role that we have."4 Roleplay- 
ing is thus an indication of "bad faith." I n  an  attempt to escape 
the burden of freedom and of the personal responsibility which 
it entails, the individual flees into "bad faith." 
Human beings are "beings-for-themselves"; i.e. conscious beings 
with no fixed essence. They therefore have the opportunity to de- 
velop and to improve; they are free. But they Ion5 for a state of 
"being-in-itself," an  unconscious state in which things essentially 
are what they are without the possibility of change. By adopting 
various kinds of pretences, they may seem to themselves to have no 
choices left, and they may convinve themselves that their actions 
are totally determined by the role they play. I n  this way, they feel, 
they cannot be held responsible. I n  L'Etre et le Neant Sartre gives an 
example of such a person5. He deliberately plays at the role of being 
a waiter and his only wish is to become identified with this role 
completely. As Mary Warnock sums up: 
All conscious beings, beings-for-themselves, are without essence. . . They have t~ 
choose their life, and so choose what they are. Beings-in-themselves, on the other 
hand, are massiJ They are wholly and unambiguously, for ever, what they are. 
Conscious beings long for this safe, solid condition. The hollowness which afflicts 
them is the same as their freedom, and it is burdensome. So the aim of Bad Faith 
is to bring a man as near as possible to the condition of a thing, an object, to be 
simply summed up in a word, a l u r e  waiter through and through, who has no 
more choice of how to behave than a robot-waiter has.6 
"Bad faith" is thus "essentially a denial of our freedom of choice,'" 
and therefore any evasion of responsibility is considered by Sartre 
as an instance of "bad faith." 
The conscious being has been especially prone to make this lapse 
into "bad faith'' since Nietzsche did away with the comforting belief 
in a transcendent justification. The two world wars have also played 
their part in heightening the sense of disillusionment which always 
accompanies the loss of fixed traditional values, and the result has 
been that the existentialist notion of the absurdity of life has acquir- 
ed a status of almost general validity. 
Albert Camus has developed his entire philosophy around the 
thesis of the absurdity of life. According to him, the disparity be- 
tween the individual and the world does not stem from either one 
of these two factors, but is determined, rather, by the interaction 
between the two. In  itself, the world is not absurd; it merely exists. 
Likewise, man is not absurd when taken on his own. He merely 
exists as a being who has certain demands to make of life. He asks 
for purpose, order, and fulfilment, but the world cannot fulfil these 
demands (only man can) and therefore the relationship between 
man and the world, i.e. life, becomes absurd. Man makes it so with 
his demands. 
When life has no transcendental purpose and when existence has 
no meaning outside of itself, conscious beings feel "nausea" when 
they contemplate the multiplicity and chaos of things in the world. 
They seek the easiest way to defend themselves from the unpredict- 
able ways of this hostile world and they find it by becoming so self- 
involved that they are no longer vulnerable to the blows it gives. 
They lapse into "bad faith." The problem with "bad faith," how- 
ever, is that it leads to alienation. The individual's way of looking 
at himself gradually becomes so different from other people's view 
of him that he is in danger of alienating himself from himself. He 
risks to lose his identity - and this leads me back to Bellow's novels. 
In Mr Samler's Planet Saul Bellow has stated the thematic setting 
of all of his novels in Mr Samler's reflection that, 
Now, as everyone knows, it has only been in the last two centuries that the 
majority of people in civilized countries have claimed the privilege of being 
individuals. Formerly they were slave, peasant, labourer, even artisan, but not 
person. It is clear that this revolution. . . has also introduced new kinds of grief 
and misery, and so far, on the broadest scale, it has not been altogether a suc- 
cess. . . We have fallen into much ugliness. I t  is bewildering to see how much 
these new individuals suffer, with their new leisure and liberty. (SP, p. 183)8 
The modern individual's conflict with his conception of self in his 
administration of this new freedom is a theme which runs through 
all the novels. This theme is viewed on the background of the ex- 
istentialist demand that the individual fulfil himself as an existing 
person. I n  order to feel secure in the chaos of modern reality, the 
individual has created "roles" and limited versions of reality, reify- 
ing himself by lapsing into "bad iaith." Instead of reducing himself 
to a thing by playing at different social "roles" in different situa- 
tions, and, especially, by identifying himself with those masks, he 
must strip himself of all of those artificial "pretender-souls"g which 
make up his "death-in-life," and make an effort to realize his true, 
natural self. 
The individual has taken on the "roles" in a desperate attempt 
to subject himself to fate in order to escape responsibility for him- 
self or, more specifically, to escape the responsibility of administering 
his freedom to choose to become a truly existing person. This is what 
Sartre calls "bad faith." He must now throw this false identity off 
and accept responsibility for his own development. In existentialist 
terms real life (acceptance of reality) is an opportunity; it is a form 
of being which must be chosen by the individual and which does 
not exist until it is chosen. I t  is the only form of existence which is 
worth-while. 
I n  chosing reality, however, the individual must accept the ex- 
istentialist notion of the absurdity of life. Man must accept the fact 
that life is not determined for him; he must determine his life for 
himself. He is free to make his own choices, but he must also be 
aware that no matter what he eventually chooses, the choice will 
be for nothing. I t  is absurd. And because existence has no transcen- 
dental meaning outside of itself, the only thing that man can rely 
on is death. Only death is certain. Everything else is subject to the 
individual's own free choice. Man must, therefore, accept the fact 
that death is part of reality. I t  is especially important that he learns 
to accept his own personal death as a natural part of true reality. 
This means that he must give up his comforting belief in immortal- 
ity, or, in the case of Bellow's heroes, his romantic belief in a release 
from mortality. 
This is where most of Bellow's protagonists become frustated and 
alienated. None of them are able to accept reality because of their: 
intense fear of facing death as the only certainty in an absurd world, 
and in their paranoid flight from a confrontation with their own 
mortality, they only entangle themselves even more in the suffocat- 
ing web of alienation which is a result of "bad faith." Trying to 
escape from physical nature, the protagonists are suddenly confront- 
ed with a sense of unreality. The ephemeral nature of the world has 
become unreal to them because they have deluded tlzemselves into 
thinking that they are n0.t part of it. I n  their attempts to evade the 
limitations of physical existence, they have set themselves above re- 
ality - and have lost it. Lapsing into "bad faith"they seek to reify 
themselves, to identify themselves with "things" in order to escape 
death, and in this way they create an artificial world. Therefore the 
first obstacle to be overcome in man's search for a meaningful ex- 
istence, for a life within reality, is this evasion oi physical nature. 
Instead of trying to overcome insurmountable limitations, man must 
accept that he, too, is part of that physical existence which he has 
been trying to set himself above; i.e. that he, too, will perish. Only 
then may he realize himself as a truly exisiting person. 
Eugene Henderson seems to have sensed that the acceptance of 
one's own mortality is a prerequisite of self-realization when he 
gives his opinion of the social and moral background for the quest 
of modern man: "All the major tasks and the big conquests were 
done before my time. That left the biggest problem of all, which was 
to encounter death. We've just got to do something about i t  . . ." 
(HRK, p. 258)1°. The individual's search for a fulfilment of his life, 
lor a transfer from a life of unreality to one 01 reality, is thus depen- 
dent upon his acceptance of death. This seems to me to be the over- 
all theme of Bellow's fiction. Bellow has developed this theme 
throughout his novels, experimenting with i t  by applying i t  to very 
different types of characters in an attempt to solve the problem of 
the nature of individual identity in the absurd modern world. His 
characters all pursue their own redemption from their "death-in- 
life," each in accordance with the traits of his personality, but their 
development shows a common pattern: in every novel a frustated 
individual is gradually forced by circumstances to try to give up his 
constructed reality and his constructed self (the "thingm-role to  
which he has been trying to subject his true self in his lapses into 
"bad faith.") He must do this in order to fulfil his life; i.e. in order 
to enter reality. They all succeed to a certain extent, I think, and I 
shall attempt to illustrate this by making a close analysis of one of 
the novels. 
I have chosen Bellow's fifth novel, Henderson, the Rain King, for my 
analysis because I think it provides a good example of "an existen- 
tial hero in search of existential values,"ll and therefore i t  can serve 
to illustrate the influence of French existentialism on Bellow's work. 
Eugene Henderson is an  activist hero. This rich and violent 
giant has lost his identity in the noise and mass-culture of modern 
America. By continuously lapsing into "bad faith'' he seeks to avoid 
taking any responsibility for his own life. I t  seems that he has thrown 
his true self away in order to achieve several different social "roles" 
which create a false identity: 
When I think of my condition at the age of fifty-five. . . all is grief. The facts 
begin to crowd me and soon I get a pressure in the chest. A disorderly rush begins 
- my parents, my wives, my girls, my children, my farm, my animals, my habits, 
my money, my music lessons, my drunkenness, my prejudices, my brutality, my 
teeth, my face, my soul! (p.7) 
He has taken on certain "roles" in his relationships to those people 
and to those occupations, and when he tries to answer his own ques- 
tion "Who am I?" he inevitably points to those relations, thus 
identifying himself with all his social "roles.'' But this reference to 
his "roles" does not identify his true self, only its relation to the 
various  role^,'^ and he comes to the conclusion that he is merely 
an empty shell with a false and unreal identity. By having created 
his own (false) reality and his own (false) self in relation to it, he has 
made himself into an image to protect himself from physical reality, 
and, especially, from having to face his own mortality. But in this 
attempt to go beyond human mortality - and human life generally - 
he plays at being God, and this results in his alienation from life, 
from other people, and most importantly, from his true self. Hen- 
derson's need to set himself above the reality which includes his 
own personal extinction places him in the realm of unreality. He 
feels his "living death" as "a pressure in the chest" (p. 71, and his 
perpetual role-playing and his insistence that he deserve a special 
destiny make it impossible for him to associate himself with other 
human beings. Henderson's despair of the meaninglessness and 
emptiness of his life is manifested by "a ceaseless voice in my heart 
that said, I want, I want, I want oh, I want" (p. 15). The voice 
wants without saying what it wants, so in order to satisfy it, Hender- 
son must proceed by the method of trial and error to find out what 
it is that it wants so badly. He looks for an answer in literature, 
he tries to satisfy it with money, with sex, with violence, with hard 
manual labor, with yells, with pigs, and with violin lessons (in an 
attempt to recapture his own past and thus to escape morality), but 
nothing works. As his frustrations increase in number, he gets more 
and more aggressive. In  old Mr Sammler's words: "When people 
are so desperately impotent they play that instrument, the per- 
sonality, louder and wilder" (SP, p. 187). Apparently all Hender- 
son's social and human needs are fuliilled: he has money, sex, and 
the sense of continuity which children bring, but his voice still wants 
more, and he is beginning to sense that this   more,^' which the voice 
wants, must be a qualitative change and not a quantitative one. 
The "actual day of tears and madness" (p. 39) brings Henderson 
the confrontation with his own "living death" that is necessary to 
make him realize that he cannot go on "spending" his "life" in this 
way. Looking down at his dead housekeeper he realizes that death is 
inevitable, and he seems to sense that not even he may escape it. In- 
stead of seeing death as a manifestation of all human limits, as he 
bas done until now, he suddenly feels that it has no real significance: 
"So this was it, the end - farewell?" (p. 40). Therefore there is no 
need for him to go on deceiving himself that he is a "thing" beyond 
the limits of the human condition. He might as well try to face true 
reality and to accept death as a natural part of his existence. In 
order to pursue this new train of thought, he "pins a note DO NOT 
DISTURB to the old lady's skirt" (p. 40) and goes to have a look 
a t  her cottage. Looking at all the junk she has collected to fill up her 
empty existence, Henderson is shocked to see the obvious parallel 
to his own life: 
Oh,  shame, shame! Oh  crying shame! How can we? Why do we allow ourselves? 
What are we doing? The last little room of dirt is waiting. Without windows. 
So for God's sake make a move, Henderson, put forth effort. You, too, will die of 
this pestilence. Death will annihilate you and nothing will remain, and thcre will 
be nothing left but junk. Because nothing will have been and so nothing will be left. 
While something still is - now! For the sake of all, get out. (p.40, my italics) 
This existentialist insight heightens his awareness of his own wasted 
life. He realizes that he has reduced himself to "nothing" by the way 
that he has "spent" his "life" until now. Having fled his human con- 
dition, which must be lived within an acknowledgement of death, he 
has been trying to reduce himself to a state of pure "thingness," and 
thus he has alienated himself from his surroundings and from his 
own true self. He sees that unless he tries to work with himself in 
order to make himself give up his role-playing and those perpetual 
lapses into "bad faith" which the role-playing signifies, he will even- 
tually imprison himself in the realm of unreality, and he will end 
u p  having made a gross absurdity of his life - just like the old woman. 
Henderson goes to the Africa of his soul. The wilderness and 
,darkness of the African interior is likened to the bewilderment in 
Henderson's mind, and thus his experiences in Africa represent his 
various stages of development in this Bildungsroman. This inter- 
pretation is supported by Henderson's recognition that "maybe 
every guy has his own Africa" (p. 257), and by his assertion that 
"the world is a mind. Travel is mental travel" (p. 157), and it is 
further underlined by the dream-like quality of the experience, 
which is stressed throughout the novel: "For me the entire experi- 
ence has been similar to a dream " (p. 262). Henderson starts out 
on his quest in order to pursue his true self and to learn to accept 
reality. If he is able to attain both, he hopes that he can thereby 
fulfil himself as a truly existing person. In this way the confronta- 
tion with death has turned him into an active searcher for self. 
The two native tribes Henderson meets in Africa make up a 
picture of two Sartrean fundamental ways of relating oneself to 
others. Although Sartre claims that any genuine, harmonious re- 
lationship between people is impracticable, he nevertheless admits 
that the fellow being is indispensable for our understanding of our- 
selves. We need "the Other" in order to define ourselves: "the ex- 
istence of the person, the for-itself, is actually dependent on the ex- 
istence of another person. Without it, no one would be able to con- 
ceive any definition of himself."12 The two alternative types of 
"relationships of cons~iousnesses"~~ which Henderson is confronted 
with in Africa are those which are most common, according to 
Sartre.14 In Sartre's terms, the Arnewi tribe symbolize the mas- 
ochistic aspect of a relationship in that they continuously try to reify 
themselves by wishing to make themselves into "objects" to be 
dominated by others, or by external events (cf. the drought). They 
submit themselves to fate because they are unable to accept re- 
sponsibility for themselves. The Wariri, on the other hand, are 
embodiments of the sadistic type of relationship. They try to domi- 
nate others by subjugating them to their own personal wishes (cf. 
the beating of the gods). Together, they make up the dual aspect 
of that sado-masochism which any existentialist must accept as the 
basis of his relationships to other beings. 
On this point Bellow seems to have adopted Sartre's distinction 
between the various possible types of relationships, but simulta- 
neously it looks as if he rejects the conclusion reached by Sartre: 
that all human relationships are bitter fights in which the two 
parties involved alternately try to subjugate themselves to the other, 
or to subject the other, as the case may be. Instead of considering 
genuine human relationships impossible, as Sartre does, Bellow seems 
to entertain a romantic hope that Henderson may achieve a state of 
harmony by seeking to find a compromise between those two alter- 
native ways of behavior towards "the Other." 
Henderson first visits the meek and cattle-loving Arnewi tribe, 
who suffer because a drought is killing their cattle. During his stay 
here, he is taken to see the Arnewi queen. This old woman asks 
Henderson who he is and where he comes from, but he is no1 pre- 
pared for those very obvious questions and he becomes frustrated 
because he does not know how to answer her. He is the total sum 
sf all of his social and moral c'roles," but he senses that the queen 
will not be satisfied by an answer which simply refers to all those 
relationships, i.e. to his false identity. What she deserves to learn is 
what his true self is really like, and this he cannot tell her: 
I began to suffer. I wish I could explain why it oppresscd me to tell about myself, 
but so it was, and I didn't know what to say. (p.73) 
Once more it was, Who are you? I had to confess that I didn't know where 
to begin. (p.74) 
Seeing that Henderson is unable to answer her question, queen 
Willatale understands that he is fleeing responsibility for himself, 
and she tells him : "World is strange to a child" (p. 81). Henderson's 
desire t a  live within the physical world, but beyond the reach of 
death has alienated him from himseli, because he has tried - in a 
very Sartrean manner - to reconcile these two irreconcilable alter- 
natives. I n  this self-deception he has behaved like a child in the 
various "roles" he has taken on in order to escape responsibility for 
his own life. When he admits this, she answers, "grun-tu-molani. 
Man want to live" (p. 81). Henderson gladly accepts her words as 
an affirmation of life. This is, indeed, exactly what he has been look- 
ing for, and he keenly adopts "this molani" (p. 82) as his new 
philosophy of life. But the Arnewi philosophy is not enough. I t  pro- 
vides Henderson with only half of the clue to the nature of the pos- 
sible relationship between man and his world. In  its affirmation of 
the opportunities of human life, it evades the question of facing 
death, a problem which is essential to Henderson's further salvation. 
On  the symbolical level this is indicated by queen Willatale's 
"defective eye" (p. 70). One of her eyes has "a cataract, bluish 
white" (p. 70), and Henderson refers to it as "the mother-of-pearl 
eye" (p. 76), "the white [eye] though blind" (p. 79), and her "one- 
eyed dreamy look" (p. 80). The choice of color and of sea-imagery 
brings to memory the frightening and vivid confrontation with 
death which Henderson once had in an aquarium in France: 
I looked in at an octopus, and the creature seemed also to look at me and press 
its soft head to the glass, flat, the flesh becoming pale and granular-blanched, 
speckled. The eyes spoke to me coldly. . . a cosmic coldness in which I felt I was 
dying. The tentacles throbbed and motioned through the glass, the bubbles 
sped upward, and I thought, "This is my last day. Death is giving me notice." 
(p.22) 
The eye with which it should be possible for Willatale to see death 
is blind, and so her outlook on reality is one-sided. Even Henderson 
senses that an affirmation of life is only part of the reality which he 
claims he has come to seek: "I figured that these Arnewi . . . had 
developed unevenly; they might have the wisdom of life, but when 
it came to frogs they were helpless" (p. 83). When it comes to facing 
death, the life-affirmative Arnewi are "irrational" (p. 83). But so is 
Henderson for he can only accept death as a part of the reality of 
others. He fails, however, to recognize this parallel to his own behav- 
ior, and instead he makes an attempt to master reality by master- 
ing the death of others: he prepares a bomb to kill the frogs which 
pollute the cistern containing the drinking water for the Arnewi 
cattle. His bomb, however, eventually blows up the entire reservoir, 
and he has to leave the Arnewi tribe very quickly. 
The Arnewi have provided Henderson with an affirmation of life, 
the '"run-tu-molani." This affirmation has fulfilled part of his need 
but not all of it, so he must continue his search for personal redemp- 
tion, for his own true "I." 
The other aspect of the dual nature of man's relationship with 
his world is provided by the Wariri tribe, the "chillen dahkness" 
(p. 108) as Romilayu calls them. On his very first night in their 
village, Henderson is confronted with death. Seeing that he and 
Rornilayu have been let into a hut in which there is a corpse, he is 
"maddened by the provocation of this corpse" (p. 130). He has 
constantly been confronted with death in its various forms (the death 
of his brother Dick, the octopus, the housekeeper, the Arnewi frogs), 
and, desperate, he begins to wonder: "Why was I lately being 
shown corpses?" (p. 127). Me seems to have a vague idea that these 
confrontations with death might be meant to teach him a lesson 
about that aspect of reality which he is not yet able to recognize: 
"the dead man in his silence sending a message to me such as, 'Here, 
man, is your being, which you think so terrific.' And just as silently 
I replied, 'Oh, be quiet dead man, for Christ's sake' " (p. 129). 
Henderson, however, still does not understand that an acceptance 
of his own mortality is a prerequisite of fulfilment as an existing 
person. Though he - rightly - says that he is "convinced that the 
presence of this corpse was a challenge which had to be answered" 
(p. 129), he nevertheless shirks from meeting this challenge in a 
proper way, and he seeks the easiest way out. Instead of trying to 
understand and accept the nature of death, he plunges headlong 
into "bad faith" and makes a paranoid attempt to reify death, 
sadistically hoping to subject it to his own personality. So, "deter- 
mined as only a man can be who is saving his life" (p. 132), i.e. his 
superficial life and his false identity, Henderson drags the dead man 
out of the hut and throws him into a ravine. Of course Henderson 
does not escape an acceptance of death so easily, and when he wakes 
up the next morning the corpse is back, symbolizing to him that 
other part of reality which he must recognize in order to reach his 
true identity. 
The Wariri king, Dahfu, is Henderson's exact opposite. On the 
symbolical level he functions as Henderson's alter ego. He is an 
embodiment partly of Reichian, partly of existentialist psychology, 
and in the beginning Henderson sees Dahfu as a kind of perfect re- 
flection of himself: "I saw that he was some kind of genius. Much 
more than that. I realized that he was a genius of my own mental 
type" (p. 202). Dahfu lives his life within an acceptance of death, 
whereas all Henderson can accept is the "grun-tu-molani," the 
affirmation of life which he has been taught by the Arnewi. Through 
his conversations with king Dahfu, Henderson is confirmed in his 
earlier recognition that this affirmative theory of life reveals only one 
side of the problem of facing reality: "Grun-tu-molani was just a 
starter," (p. 204), and a little further on Dahfu answers: "Granted, 
grun-tu-molani is much, but it is not alone sufficient. Mr Hender- 
son, more is required." (p. 204) With the purpose of teaching Hen- 
derson some of this "more" which is "required," Dahfu leads him 
down into the cellars below the palace to confront him with the 
lionness Atti. Dahfu sees Atti as an embodiment partly of Reality, 
partly of Reichian primordial force, the orgone energy. By studying 
and imitating her, Dahfu has obtained a relaxed attitude (suggested 
by the name Atti) towards death, and he wishes to share this atti- 
tude with Henderson: "You ask, what can she do for you? Many 
things. First she is unavoidable . . . And this is what you need, as 
you are an avoider. Oh, you have accomplished momentous avoid- 
ances. But she will change that . . . She will force the present moment 
upon you" (p. 242-3). Dahfu, in other words, wants to change 
Henderson by forcing him to confront and accept reality. He wishes 
him to combine his acceptance of life, which the Arnewi have taught 
him, with an acknowledgement of his own mortality. Only when 
he has done so will he be able to leave his false reality behind and 
enter reality, the given: "I should move from the states that I my- 
self make into the sta.tes which are of themselves" (p. 265). 
At first, however, Henderson holds back out of his fear of death. 
The challenge of facing Atti seems to be almost too great for him to  
meet, but it nevertheless urges him forward on his way to self- 
realization. Not only must he accept his own mortality; he must 
also acknowledge the inhuman aspects of his soul, his own primor- 
dial passions. The vehicle which Dahfu employs for Henderson's 
transformation is Reichian psychoanalysis; he wishes to crack up  
the "pretender-soul," which Henderson has constructed to defend 
himsell from anxieties, by physical means. Henderson must try to 
"act the lion" (p. 247) and to "be the beast . . . be it utterly" (p. 
249). But he has difficulties: " 'I feel the old self more than ever,' 
I said. 'I feel it all the time. It's got a terrific grip on me . . . As if 
I were carrying an eight-hundred-pound load - like a Galjpagos 
turtle. On my back' " (p. 257). Like most of the other Bellow- 
heroes, Henderson tries to throw off the burden of his old self which 
prevents him from becoming human, and as in most of Bellow's 
other novels this burdensome ego is described in terms of a huge 
weight which the hero feels is weighing him down. Tommy FVilhelm 
felt that he "was assigned to be the carrier of a load which was his 
own self, his characteristic self" (SD, p. 44), and he described this 
burden as "a wallowing hippopotamus" (SD, p. 61). Henderson's 
complaint of the weight he has to carry brings to mind Bellow's use 
of sea-imagery for connotations of death. The GalApagos turtle is a 
sea animal like the octopus, and both are symbols of death, and, by 
extension, of his old false identity which must be given up.15 
Henderson eventually gives in to Dahfu's wishes and obeying his 
instructions he tries to imitate the lion. This does, indeed, help him 
to shake off at least part of his isolated and egocentric individualism, 
and at the time when he writes a letter to Lily he has reached a cer- 
tain insight : 
I was very stubborn. I wanted to raise myself into another world. My life and 
deeds were a prison. (p.266) 
I had a voice that said, I want! I want? I ?  I t  should have told me she wants, 
he wants, they want. And moreover, it's love that makes reality reality. The  
opposite makes the opposite. (p.267) 
So, in accordance with the Sartrean notion that one needs "the 
Other" as a foil against which to define oneself, Henderson recog- 
nizes that by isolating himself from other people, he has become 
estranged from himself. But parting company with Sartre over his 
claim that genuine human relationships are impossible, he realizes 
that one must relate oneself to others in order to become truly 
human. I n  Martin Buber's words: "The concentration and fusion 
into a whole being can never be accomplished by me, can never be 
accomplished without me. I require a You to become; becoming I, 
I say You. All actual life is encounter."16 
Dahfu's experimental transformation of Henderson is left in- 
complete when he dies. Contrarily to Henderson, Dahfu is not an 
avoider; he has lived by the rule of the lion, and hence he must die 
by that same r ~ d e .  His death by the wild lion is an ironic confirma- 
tion of his own earlier philosophic statement that "Where a man 
conflicts there he will fall, and if taking the sword also perishes by 
the sword" (p. 185). Henderson faces his own symbolical death in 
Dahfu's, but he also sees it as a representation of that physical death 
which he must prepare himself to face. 
The moment of overwhelming dread which Henderson undergoes 
in this confrontation with the death of his alter ego serves to shatter 
his ego-emphasis, and this marks for him the beginning of a new 
kind of existence within an acceptance of reality: "But now I was 
blasted away from this practice [of unreality] by the throat of the 
lion" (p. 287). This way of overcoming one's alienation is quite in 
accordance with Karl Jasper's view of the circumstances under which 
an individual may eventually throw off his false self and realize 
himself as an existing person. Jasper thinks that behind the empirical 
self the individual has a true self of which he is made aware in what 
Jasper calls "boundary situations," i.e. in "situations of an extreme 
kind where we confront despair, guilt, anxiety and death. I n  these 
moments of awareness we realize our own responsibility for what 
we are, and the reality of freedom of choice is thrust upon us."]' 
Henderson now realizes that he must accept his freedom to choose 
his own life, and he sees that in his various attempts to avoid the 
presence of death he has, paradoxically, avoided life. He realizes that 
his emphasis on his individuality has kept him aloof from other hu- 
man beings and from the true existence which his inner need kept 
demanding. This insight agrees with Sartre5s view of death. He urges 
the individual to cultivate the a-warenesss of death chiefly as a means 
of hightening his sense of life; only when the individual has accepted 
the fact that he will eventually die, may he succeed in realizing 
himself - and thus fulfil his life. 
Henderson's original purpose in going to Africa was to pursue his 
authentic self and to achieve an understanding of reality. I t  had 
been his hope that those two goals would constitute, somehow, true 
beingness. I t  has not been so easy as he had expected, but through 
the various experiences he has undergone he has developed another 
awareness of himself. One insight which Henderson has gained in 
Africa is a recognition that he is basically just like other human 
beings, and especially, that others fight the same problems of iden- 
tity as he has fought: "What I'd like to know is why this has to be 
fought by everybody, for there is nothing that's struggled against 
so hard as coming-to. We grow these sores instead. Burning sores, 
fertile sores" (p. 306). This realization has given him an  understand- 
ing of himself and of "the Other." His recognition of his own reasons 
for creating "these burning sores" may enable him to help others 
toward self-realization, and thus he may finally be able to reach his 
goal of becoming a doctor, or maybe even a savior of mankind. To 
a certain extent this implies that Henderson has not changed at all, 
but I think that Bellow has at least intended a change. I t  must, 
however, be a sort of change that it would be likely for a character 
like Henderson to undergo. Henderson must still be Henderson, and 
this is achieved through the comic tone of the last chapters and 
through an insistance on his impulsiveness. 
Most critics have argued that the Persian boy whom Henderson 
meets on the plane is an  embodiment of "his true self, the child he  
had been and had become alienated from."18 I disagree. I think 
that the alien orphan is, rather, an image of his childish and alienat- 
ed false self from which he has not been able to disentangle himself, 
and which he is now able to embrace as an empirical element of 
his newly found identity upon which he can build his further devel- 
opment. Henderson is still in a state of "becoming" (p. 150). Thus 
I see the boy as a confirmation that Henderson has not changed 
very much. He has, indeed, achieved certain insights, "Yes, I saw 
a few things in the interior. Yes I did. I have had a look into some 
of the fundamentals" (p. 309)' but he is not fundamentally different 
from the man who sct out to find himself. This view of the syrnboli- 
cal significance of the boy is supported by his nationality: he is a 
Persian and speaks "only Persian" (p. 313). Similarly Henderson 
"with hair like Persian lambs' fur" (p. 8) spoke only "Hender- 
sonian" before he set out on his quest, i.e. his stress on his indi- 
viduality made it impossible for him to relate himself to others - or 
wen  to communicate with them. In  Africa he has been able to re- 
move part of his ego-emphasis by his acknowledgement of other in- 
dividuals ("she, he, they want," p. 267) ,  but it seems that his char- 
acter is still essentially egotistic. Thus it seems to me that the ques- 
tion of whether Henderson's self-realization leads to more permanent 
changes is left unanswered. By the symbols he has employed, Bellow 
seems to indicate that Henderson's transformation enables him to 
confront his own mortality and to exist in the here-and-now: "I 
guess I felt that it was my turn now to move and so went running - 
leaping, leaping, pounding, and tingling over the pure white lining 
of the grey Arctic silence" (p. 3 18). But this change is merely hinted 
at by the connotations of the symbols employed. Henderson's joy 
in the face of death ("the pure white lining of the grey Arctic si- 
lence") is not a logical outcome of his experiences in Africa, and 
it is not convincing. 
The constant repetition throughout Bellow's fiction of the theme 
of the alienated individual's search for a meaningful existence un- 
derlines the importance he must assign to it. But the repetition of 
< c open" endings reveals a certain doubt on the part of Bellow as to 
whether that particular kind of self-realization which he advocates 
is actually attainable in our absurd modern society. Unlike Sartre's 
and Camus' philosophical novels, Bellow's novels do not end with the 
hero's self-destruction. I t  is the logic of absurdity that the hero can 
only recognize his identity at the moment when he destroys it. Sartre 
and Camus both believe in the destructive nature of self-fulfilment, 
but here Bellow dissociates himself from the conclusions reached by 
French existentialism. As an American, brought up on the doctrine 
of the individual's unlimited opportunities, and writing within a 
literary tradition which has been dominated by authors like Emer- 
son and Thoreau, i t  i s  understandable, I think, that Bellow has to 
try to find a different solution to the problem of the nature of ex- 
istence: "Otherwise, accelerating like a stone, you fall from life to 
death. Exactly like a stone, straight into deafness, and till the last 
repeating I want I want I want, then striking the earth and entering 
it forever!" (p. 277) Philosophically this places him somewhere be- 
tween existentialism and transcendentalism. I n  his considerations 
of moral and metaphysical problems he does not adhere to either 
doctrine, but seems, rather, to have selected the theses which he 
feels will be of use to him in determining the nature of modern ex- 
istence from both. This is what Richard Lehan very appropriately 
refers to as "the eclectic nature of American existentiali~m."~~ 
Henderson seems to voice this (lack of?) attitude in his letter to 
Lily: "We are the first generation to see the clouds from both sides. 
What a privilege! First people dreamed upward. Now they dream 
both upward and downward. This is bound to change something, 
somwhere" (p. 261-2). People's dreams "upward" symbolize their 
belief in religious transcendentalism, whereas their "downward" 
dreams are symbols of their adherence to the existentialist theory of 
the absurdity of life. Obviously Henderson feels that the answer to 
the question of the nature of individual existence lies somewhere in 
between these two extremes, and it seems to me that this must be 
Bellow's solution, too. 
I t  seems to be the nature of Bellow's work to try out his theories 
about the problems of existence on the various protagonists of his 
novels, experimenting with them by applying them to widely diffe- 
rent types of characters. I n  this way he seems to hope to eventually 
be able to reconcile the two seemingly irreconcilable philosophical 
movements of Transcendentalism and Existentialism. If he ever 
succeeds in making this compromise, Bellow will also have proved 
the Sartrean notion that true beingness is that state which simul- 
taneously contains pure matter and pure consciousness. Sartre feels 
that such a state of purposefulness can only be momentary, whereas 
Bellow seems to feel his way between the two philosophical extremes 
in order to try to give a more permanent meaning to modern ex- 
istence. 
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